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JUSTICE BRANDEIS AND  
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Barry Cushman† 
HEN ONE THINKS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS and substantive 
due process, one thinks of his famous dissents. Through-
out his nearly twenty-three year tenure on the Supreme 
Court, Brandeis published a series of landmark, fact-
saturated, and prophetic dissents against decisions invalidating state or 
federal regulation on the ground that they worked a deprivation of liberty 
or property without due process of law. The list of such dissents is a famil-
iar one. Among the more celebrated are those in Adams v. Tanner,1 which 
struck down a Washington State statute prohibiting employment agencies 
from taking fees from those seeking employment; in Truax v. Corrigan, 
where the majority vindicated a challenge to a statute restricting the power 
of state courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes;2 in Jay Burns Baking 
Co. v. Bryan,3 which invalidated a Nebraska statute prescribing weight 
ranges for loaves of bread offered for sale; and in New State Ice v. Liebmann, 
where, dissenting from an opinion declaring unconstitutional an Oklahoma 
statute requiring those wishing to enter the business of manufacturing and 
selling ice to secure a certification of necessity from the State, Brandeis 
remarked: “There must be power in the States and the nation to remould, 
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1 244 U.S. 590, 597 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
2 257 U.S. 312, 354 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
3 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet 
changing social and economic needs . . . . we must be ever on our guard 
lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the 
light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.” 4 In each of these dissents, 
Brandeis presented a rich description of the evils that the statutes in ques-
tion sought to remedy, and an impressive defense of the challenged 
measures as reasonable and appropriate tonics for the evils documented. 
And though he was not yet on the Court when Holmes published his sem-
inal dissents from major decisions invalidating labor regulations,5 Brandeis 
likewise often noted his dissents from opinions striking down statutes on 
the ground that they infringed the liberty of contract.6 Indeed, Brandeis 
reportedly would have preferred that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause never had been ratified, and maintained that the Clause 
should be repealed, or at the very least restricted in its application to pro-
cedural matters.7 
                                                                                                                           
4 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
5 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Adair v. United 
States, 208 U.S. 161, 190 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
6 See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 631, 636 (1936) 
(Brandeis joins Hughes and Stone dissents); Fairmont Creamery v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 
1, 11 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 377 
(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis did not participate in Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), which invalidated as an infringement of liberty of con-
tract a minimum wage law for women, and so did not join Holmes’s dissent there. How-
ever, he did expressly dissent from two subsequent per curiam opinions invalidating simi-
lar minimum wage laws on the authority of Adkins. See Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. 
Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927) (Arkansas statute); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) 
(Arizona statute). 
7 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 619 (2009); WILLIAM G. ROSS, FORGING 
NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927 188 (1994); 
Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 318, 
325; ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 26 (1978). 
There is a substantial literature emphasizing the aforementioned aspects of Brandeis’s 
views on due process. See, e.g., UROFSKY, supra, at 483-85, 596-98, 603-05, 678-83; 
STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF 
LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 259-61, 272, 302-05, 306-07 (1994); PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 303-05, 347-48 (1984); SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, 
THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS 99-102, 129-36, 150-51, 153-56, 177-80 (1956). 
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Yet confining our field of vision to these familiar declarations would 
leave us with a misleading impression. First, as is well known, there were 
instances in which Brandeis joined opinions invalidating non-economic 
regulations on the ground that they violated the Due Process Clause. In 
1923, for example, Brandeis joined two McReynolds opinions invalidating 
state laws prohibiting the teaching of modern foreign languages to primary 
school students.8 Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,9 Brandeis signed on 
to McReynolds’s opinion declaring that a state law prohibiting private  
education ran afoul of the Due Process Clause. Indeed, in these cases, 
Brandeis was more solicitous of substantive due process claims than was 
Holmes. Holmes dissented in the language cases, and Justice Butler’s con-
ference notes suggest that Holmes went along in Pierce largely if not solely 
because he regarded the question as governed by those decisions.10 
More to the point, a narrow focus on Brandeis’s celebrated dissents 
would overlook the numerous instances in which Brandeis joined or wrote 
opinions in which the Court held that an economic regulation deprived the 
regulated party of its liberty or property without due process of law. As 
Professor Michael Phillips has shown, Holmes was far from a dogmatic 
opponent of economic substantive due process. Though he persistently 
derided “the dogma, Liberty of Contract,”11 in fact he joined opinions in-
voking that doctrine to invalidate regulatory legislation on more than one 
occasion,12 and he wrote or joined numerous opinions striking down a 
variety of economic regulations on substantive due process grounds.13 The 
                                                                                                                           
8 Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
9 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
10 Butler OT 1924 Docket Book, Office of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United 
States (hereafter “OCSCOTUS”) (Holmes: “As an original prop[osition] might be trou-
blesome without Meyer”). 
11 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
12 Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas, 267 U.S. 552 
(1925) (hereafter “Wolff Packing II”); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial 
Relations of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522 (1923); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 
(1918). See also Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924); St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. 
v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922). 
13 See MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930S 60, 61, 89 n.243, 95 (2001); Michael J. Phillips, 
The Substantive Due Process Decisions of Mr. Justice Holmes, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 437 (1999); 
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same was true of Brandeis’s posture toward economic substantive due 
process. Though he was a frequent critic of certain of its strands – liberty 
of contract, limiting price regulation to businesses “affected with a public 
interest,”14 and a branch of the doctrine limiting the taxing jurisdiction of 
states and territories15 – his opposition to this dimension of the Court’s 
jurisprudence was far less pervasive than one might surmise. 
Consider first a trio of cases from the mid-1920s in which the Court 
unanimously struck down orders of the Kansas Industrial Court on the 
ground that they deprived a company of its liberty of contract and/or 
property without due process of law. The Industrial Court was established 
by the Kansas legislature in 1920 as part of a system of compulsory arbitra-
tion of labor disputes. The statute’s purpose was to preserve industrial 
peace and secure continuity of operation in various vital industries, and to 
these ends the Industrial Court was authorized to prescribe wages and 
other terms of employment for companies engaged in such enterprises. In 
the 1923 decision of Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations 
of Kansas (“Wolff Packing I”), the Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
meatpacking business was not sufficiently public in character to be subject 
to state regulation designed to secure its continuity of operation, and that 
the Industrial Court’s order fixing the wages paid by a meatpacking con-
cern therefore deprived the company of liberty of contract and property 
without due process.16 The following year, Brandeis himself wrote the 
unanimous opinion extending the reasoning of Wolff Packing to the coal 
                                                                                                                           
Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process Effective?, 48 
MERCER L. REV. 1049, 1083-86 (1997). 
14 See, e.g., Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 
418 (1927). See also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
15 See, e.g., Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422, 441 (1935) (Brandeis joins Stone dissent); First 
National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 334 (1932) (Brandeis joins Stone dis-
sent); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 596, 599 (1930) (Brandeis joins Holmes and 
Stone dissents); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 218 (1930) 
(Brandeis joins Holmes dissent); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460, 467 
(1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector 
of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 101 (1927) (Brandeis joins Holmes dissent); Southern 
Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 274 U.S. 76, 86 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Alpha Portland 
Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 220 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Union 
Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 287 (1919) (Brandeis joins Pitney dissent). 
16 262 U.S. 522 (1923). 
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industry.17 And again in 1925, Brandeis joined the unanimous opinion inval-
idating the Industrial Court’s maximum hours order to the Wolff Packing 
Company on the ground that it infringed liberty of contract and deprived 
the company of property without due process (“Wolff Packing II”). Brandeis 
returned Chief Justice Taft’s draft opinion in Wolff Packing I with laudatory 
remarks,18 and Justice Butler’s docket books show that Brandeis voted 
with the majority at conference in each of these cases.19 Brandeis’s perfor-
mance in the Kansas Industrial Court cases accurately reflected his substan-
tive due process commitments. 
Though Brandeis disparaged “[t]he notion of a distinct category of busi-
ness ‘affected with a public interest,’” as resting “upon historical error,”20 
he occasionally agreed with the results reached by colleagues reasoning 
within that analytic category. For instance, he agreed with Justice Holmes’s 
1921 opinion upholding a temporary rent control measure in the District 
of Columbia enacted in response to “emergencies growing out of the war, 
resulting in rental conditions in the District dangerous to the public health 
and burdensome to public officers, employees and accessories, and thereby 
embarrassing the Federal Government in the transaction of the public 
business.” Holmes opined that such circumstances had “clothed the letting 
of buildings in the District of Columbia with a public interest so great as to 
justify regulation by law.”21 Three years later, however, when a landlord 
challenged the regulation on the ground that the emergency that had justi-
fied the regulation no longer obtained and that it was now therefore un-
constitutional, Brandeis joined the unanimous conference vote to remand 
the case to the lower court to make the relevant factual determination, as 
well as the unanimous opinion suggesting that changed conditions had de-
prived the measure of its constitutional foundation.22  
                                                                                                                           
17 Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924). 
18 See Justice Brandeis, Return of Wolff Packing I, William Howard Taft Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress (hereafter “MDLC”), Reel 639 (“Yes. This will clarify 
thought and bury the ashes of a sometime presidential boom”).  
19 Butler OT 1922-1924 Docket Books, OCSCOTUS. 
20 New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 302 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
21 Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 154, 155 (1921). 
22 Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1924); Butler OT 1923 Docket 
Book, OCSCOTUS. 
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Similarly, when the Court invalidated price regulation of retail gasoline 
sales in Tennessee on the ground that the business was not “affected with a 
public interest,” Brandeis concurred in the result,23 presumably, as one 
commentator surmised, because there was no showing “that the business 
was peculiarly subject to abuse in the matter of price.”24 In Michigan Pub. 
Util. Comm’n v. Duke, Brandeis respected the public/private distinction by 
joining the Court’s unanimous condemnation of the state’s attempt “to 
convert property used exclusively in the business of a private carrier into a 
public utility, or to make the owner a public carrier” as a deprivation of 
property without due process.25 Brandeis and his colleagues followed Duke 
in Smith v. Cahoon, which invalidated a statute regulating private carriers 
for hire in the same manner as common carriers.26 
Brandeis’s embrace of substantive due process was most prominently 
on display in the many cases in which he either joined in or concurred 
with opinions holding that a rate regulation deprived a common carrier or 
public utility of its property without due process by not affording the 
company a reasonable rate of return on its investment. Though Brandeis 
differed from many of his colleagues concerning how a reasonable return 
on investment should be computed27 – and as a consequence he occasion-
ally dissented from opinions finding that a rate regulation violated due 
process28 – he joined or concurred in the vast majority of the decisions in 
                                                                                                                           
23 Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 245 (1928). Brandeis also voted to invali-
date the statute in conference. Stone OT 1928 Docket Book, OCSCOTUS. 
24 Breck P. McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 
759, 786 (1930). 
25 266 U.S. 570, 571 (1925). Brandeis also voted with the majority at the conference. 
Butler OT 1924 Docket Book, OCSCOTUS. 
26 283 U.S. 553 (1931). Brandeis again voted with the majority at conference. Stone OT 
1930 Docket Book, OCSCOTUS. Compare Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’r 
of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 600 (1926) (Holmes & Brandeis, J.J., dissenting). 
27 See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 
(1923) (Brandeis concurring in judgment holding telephone rates confiscatory, but dis-
senting as to rationale). 
28 West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Baltimore, 295 U.S. 662, 693 (1935) 
(Brandeis joins Stone dissent); United Rys. & Elec. Co. of Balt. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 
255 (1930) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 
400, 421 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 
265 U.S. 403, 416 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Vandalia R.R. v. Schnull, 255 U.S. 
Justice Brandeis and Substantive Due Process 
WINTER 2016 151 
which he participated where the Court invalidated such a regulation on 
due process grounds.29 In fact, he authored two such opinions.30 As he 
stated in his 1936 concurrence in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, a 
rate regulation order of the Secretary of Agriculture issued under the 
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 “may, of course, be set aside for viola-
tion of the due process clause by prescribing rates which, on the facts 
found, are confiscatory.”31  
                                                                                                                           
113, 123 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Detroit United Ry. v. City of Detroit, 248 
U.S. 429, 446 (1919) (Brandeis joins Clarke dissent); City of Denver v. Denver Union 
Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 198 (1918) (Brandeis joins Holmes dissent). 
29 West Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 294 U.S. 79 (1935); West Ohio Gas Co. v. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 294 U.S. 63 (1935); Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n of Ohio, 292 U.S. 398 (1934); Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 
290 U.S. 264 (1933); R.R. Comm’n v. Maxcy, 282 U.S. 249 (1931); Denney v. Pac. 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 276 U.S. 97 (1928); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Public Utils. 
Comm’n, 274 U.S. 344 (1927); Ottinger v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 272 U.S. 579, 
581 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the result); Patterson v. Mobile Gas Co., 271 
U.S. 131 (1926); Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23 (1926); 
Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926); Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U.S. 413 
(1925); Ohio Util. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio, 267 U.S. 359 (1925); Bluefield 
Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679, 690 (1923) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment); Prendergast v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43 
(1923); City of Paducah v. Paducah Ry., 261 U.S. 267 (1923); Missouri ex rel. S.W. 
Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring 
in the judgment); Newton v. Consol. Gas Co., 258 U.S. 165 (1922); City of San Anto-
nio v. San Antonio Pub. Serv. Co., 255 U.S. 547 (1921); S. Iowa Elec. Co. v. City of 
Chariton, 255 U.S. 539 (1921); Rowland v. Boyle, 244 U.S. 106 (1917). See also Miss. 
R.R. Comm’n v. Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 388 (1917). Brandeis passed at the 
conference vote in the two West Ohio Gas cases, expressed jurisdictional reservations at 
the Central Kentucky conference, dissented at the Ohio Utilities conference, and is recorded 
ambiguously at the Bluefield conference. For the last seven cases cited, there are no dock-
et book records of the conference votes. Brandeis voted with the conference majority in 
each of the remaining ten cases. Butler OT 1922, 1924, & 1933 Docket Books; Stone 
1924-1927, 1930, & 1934 Docket Books, OCSCOTUS. 
30 N. Pac. Ry. v. Department of Pub. Works, 268 U.S. 39 (1925); Groesbeck v. Duluth, S. 
Shore & Atl. Ry. Co., 250 U.S. 607 (1919). 
31 298 U.S. 38, 74-75 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The fact that Brandeis invoked the 
Due Process Clause, rather than the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, in consider-
ing the constitutionality of a federal rate regulation, counsels against viewing the state 
cases invalidating “confiscatory” rate or other regulations as resting upon the incorporation 
of the Takings Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the Court consistently 
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Brandeis also joined several opinions invalidating various land use re-
strictions as inconsistent with the Due Process Clause. To be sure, he joined 
Justice Sutherland’s majority opinion upholding comprehensive residential 
real estate zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.32 At the same 
time, however, he joined Justice Day’s unanimous opinion in Buchanan v. 
Warley holding that a racially restrictive zoning ordinance deprived home-
owners of property without due process;33 he joined the decision in Nectow 
v. City of Cambridge, which unanimously held that a zoning ordinance, as 
applied, deprived a landowner of property without due process;34 and he 
joined the unanimous decision in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. 
Roberge, which invalidated as repugnant to the Due Process Clause a zoning 
ordinance conditioning permission to construct a home for the aged poor 
on the written consent of the owners of two-thirds of the property within 
400 feet of the proposed building.35 
As many of the foregoing cases suggest, Brandeis, like many of his col-
leagues who were even more fully invested in substantive due process, 
was especially skeptical of regulations that did not appear to confer a benefit 
on the public generally, but instead upon a favored group or class. Several 
decisions bring this feature of Brandeis’s jurisprudence into sharper relief. 
In Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of La., Brandeis joined Holmes’s unan-
imous opinion invalidating on due process grounds an order requiring a 
lumber company owning a narrow gauge railroad to operate its railroad at 
a loss. The opinion insisted that 
 
                                                                                                                           
maintained that such regulations, where they effectively “took” from A and gave to B, for 
a private purpose and without just compensation, violated the respective Amendments’ 
prohibitions on deprivations of property without due process. For a list of such instances 
in the federal context, see Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 
B.U. L. REV. 881, 911-12 n.141 (2005).  
32 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
33 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
34 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Here, however, Brandeis had dissented from the conference 
majority, but acquiesced in the final vote on the merits. Stone OT 1927 Docket Book, 
OCSCOTUS. 
35 278 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1928). Brandeis also voted with the majority at the conference. 
Stone OT 1928 Docket Book, OCSCOTUS. 
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[a] carrier cannot be compelled to carry on even a branch of business 
at a loss, much less the whole business of carriage. . . . The plaintiff 
may be making money from its sawmill and lumber business but it no 
more can be compelled to spend that than it can be compelled to 
spend any other money to maintain a railroad for the benefit of others 
who do not care to pay for it.36 
Similarly, in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Cahill, Brandeis joined the unanimous 
opinion holding that the order of a state railroad commission requiring a 
railroad company to install and maintain weighing scales at its stations as a 
convenience to traders in livestock was “arbitrary and unreasonable,” and 
therefore a deprivation of its property without due process of law.37  
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Co. v. Holmberg involved an 
order of the Nebraska state railway commission requiring the company to 
install, partly at its expense, an underground cattle-pass across its right of 
way. The commission ordered the construction of the underground pass 
not as a safety measure, but instead merely to spare the farmer owning 
land on either side of the railway the inconvenience of driving his cattle 
across an otherwise adequate existing grade crossing. Here again, Brandeis 
joined the unanimous opinion holding that the order “deprives plaintiff of 
property for the private use and benefit of defendant, and is a taking of 
property without due process of law, forbidden by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”38 Brandeis similarly joined opinions invalidating on due 
process grounds special tax assessments that disproportionately advantaged 
some members of the taxing district at the expense of others.39 
Late in his career, Brandeis resoundingly affirmed this principle. The 
case of Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp. involved two Texas gas 
companies seeking to enjoin enforcement of a proration order of the Texas 
                                                                                                                           
36 251 U.S. 396, 399 (1920). 
37 253 U.S. 71, 72 (1920). 
38 282 U.S. 162, 167 (1930). Brandeis voted with the majority at conference, Stone OT 
1930 Docket Book, OCSCOTUS, and wrote “Yes” or “Yes sir” on each of Stone’s four 
circulated draft opinions. Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, MDLC, Box 57. 
39 Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 274 U.S. 188 (1927); 
Standard Pipe Line Co. v. Miller County Highway & Bridge Dist., 277 U.S. 160 (1928). 
Brandeis voted with the conference majority in each of these cases. Stone OT 1925 & 
1927 Docket Books, OCSCOTUS. 
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Railroad Commission. The companies had invested significantly in the cre-
ation of markets for their gas in distant states through the acquisition and 
development of gas reserves, the drilling of wells, and the construction of 
compressor plants and pipelines. These investments had enabled the com-
panies to perform their contractual obligations without the need to purchase 
gas from other wells. The challenged order limited production of sweet 
gas from the companies’ wells to a quantity beneath their marketing  
requirements under existing contracts, below their capacity and current 
production levels, and below the capacity of their transportation and mar-
keting facilities. The order thus prevented the companies from fulfilling 
their contractual obligations unless they purchased gas from other produc-
ers. The companies alleged that both the purpose and the effect of such 
limitations on their production was not to prevent waste, nor to prevent 
invasion of the legal rights of co-owners in a common reservoir, but instead 
simply to compel them and others similarly situated to purchase gas that 
they did not need from other well owners who had not made the invest-
ments in marketing facilities, such as pipelines, that would have provided 
them with a market for their gas and the capacity to deliver it. Under ex-
isting law, such well owners without pipelines would have been required 
to cease production unless they secured some marketing outlet.40 
Brandeis’s opinion for a unanimous Court discerned that “the sole pur-
pose of the limitation which the order imposes upon the plaintiffs’ produc-
tion is to compel those who may legally produce, because they have market 
outlets for permitted uses, to purchase gas from potential producers 
whom the statute prohibits from producing because they lack such a mar-
ket for their possible product.” Accordingly, “[t]he use of the pipe line 
owner’s wells and reserves is curtailed solely for the benefit of other private 
well owners. The pipe line owner, a private person, is, in effect, ordered 
to pay money to another private well owner for the purchase of gas which 
there is no wish to buy.” This was not “for the public benefit.” The com-
panies’ pipelines were private property, built on private lands. They were 
not common carriers. The Court had “many times warned that one per-
son’s property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person 
without a justifying public purpose.” The requirement that the companies 
                                                                                                                           
40 300 U.S. 55, 58, 60-61, 67-68 (1937). 
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purchase the gas necessary to fulfill existing contracts from other producers, 
Brandeis concluded, “results in depriving the plaintiffs of property.” “Our 
law reports present no more glaring instance of the taking of one man’s 
property and giving it to another.”41 
Three years later, after Brandeis had retired, the Court effectively 
overruled Thompson when it upheld a Texas oil production proration order 
against a due process challenge. Dissenting for himself, Chief Justice 
Hughes, and Justice McReynolds, Justice Roberts invoked the authority of 
Brandeis in protest:  
The opinion of this court, in my judgment, announces principles with 
respect to the review of administrative action challenged under the 
due process clause directly contrary to those which have been estab-
lished. A recent exposition of the applicable principles is found in the 
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, written for a unanimous court, in 
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, dealing 
with a proration order affecting gas, entered by the same commission 
which entered the order here in issue. I think that adherence to the 
principles there stated requires the affirmance of the [lower court’s] 
decree [enjoining the Commission from enforcing its order].42 
                                                                                                                           
41 Id. at 77-80. 
42 R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 585 (1940) (Roberts, 
J., dissenting). For other instances in which Brandeis voted to strike down state or local 
laws as deprivations of liberty and/or property without due process, see, e.g., Safe De-
posit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 
271 U.S. 500 (1926); Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Ry. Co. v. Oklahoma, 271 U.S. 303 
(1926); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69 (1926); Lee v. Osceola 
& Little River Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 of Mississippi County, 268 U.S. 643 (1925); 
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 
260 U.S. 346 (1922); Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920); International Paper Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918); Looney v. Crane, 245 U.S. 178 (1917). Brandeis 
was in the conference majority in the first five of these cases. For the last three cases, 
there are no docket book records. In Frick, Brandeis dissented at conference. Butler OT 
1923-1924 Docket Books, Stone OT 1924, 1925, 1927, & 1929 Docket Books, 
OCSCOTUS. 
It is doubtful that in due process cases Brandeis was simply adhering to the dictates of 
stare decisis rather than voting his principles, for two reasons. First, a number of these 
decisions presented questions for which there was no clearly governing authority. Second, 
Brandeis famously argued in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. that the Court “should refuse 
to follow an earlier constitutional decision which it deems erroneous.” 285 U.S. 393, 
Barry Cushman 
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Brandeis’s former law clerk, Paul Freund, reported that Brandeis  
always considered himself a conservative,43 and compared with many of 
the justices who would succeed him, he was. Justice Hugo Black, for  
example, maintained that it was never appropriate for the Court to review 
the substance of economic regulations under the Due Process Clauses. As 
a result, he refused to follow Brandeis, Hughes, and Roberts in joining the 
portion of Stone’s majority opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 
announcing a very deferential standard of review, on the ground that it did 
not go far enough in extricating the Court from that enterprise.44 But the 
explicit premise of Brandeis’s classic critique of the investment banking 
industry, entitled Other People’s Money,45 was that there is such a thing. And 
Brandeis believed, along with contemporary colleagues with whom he 
otherwise frequently differed, that the Court had an important role to 
play, under the Due Process Clauses, in preventing its deprivation by the 
government. 
 
                                                                                                                           
406-10 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). As his persistent dissents from a variety of  
established doctrinal propositions indicate, see, e.g., the cases collected in notes 6, 14, 
15, 28, and 29, supra, he acted on this conviction throughout his judicial career. Equally 
implausible is the possible conjecture that Brandeis did not actually embrace economic 
substantive due process, but instead opportunistically invoked it (or agreed to such invo-
cations by his colleagues) when it served to invalidate a policy of which he disapproved. 
Such a cynical assessment would be difficult to square with the depth of conviction one 
senses in his Thompson opinion, and neither would it easily square with well-known  
instances in which Brandeis voted to uphold economic regulations that he regarded as 
unwise or even morally abhorrent. For example, Brandeis disapproved of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 as a policy matter, see UROFSKY at 706; LEWIS PAPER, BRANDEIS 
345-47 (1983), yet he dissented when the Court invalidated the statute in United States 
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). See id. at 88 (Brandeis joins Stone dissent). Brandeis also 
deplored the Roosevelt Administration’s gold policy, see UROFSKY at 697, 698, PAPER at 
346, yet he joined the majority to sustain the policy in the Gold Clause Cases: Perry v. 
United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); and 
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935). 
43 Paul Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in ALLISON DUNHAM & PHILIP KURLAND, eds., MR. 
JUSTICE 185 (1964). 
44 See Cushman, 85 B.U. L. REV. at 992-95. 
45 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914). 
